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Abstract
We use a novel experimental design to disentangle strategically- and non-strategically-motivated
cooperation. By using contingent responses in a repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma with
a known probabilistic end, we diﬀerentiate end-game behavior from continuation behavior
within individuals while controlling for expectations. This design allows us to determine the
extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the so-called end-
game eﬀect. Experiments with two diﬀerent subject pools indicate that the most common
motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic and that the extent to which end-
game eﬀects are driven by strategically-cooperating individuals depends on the proﬁtability
of cooperation.
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Even though there is considerable of experimental evidence suggesting that individuals cooperate
in social dilemma games with repeated interaction because of both strategic and non-strategic
motivations, the share of cooperation that can be attributed to each of these motivations has
not been precisely identiﬁed. To a large extent, this is because in repeated games one cannot tell
from observing players’ choices whether they are cooperating strategically or not. In this paper,
we report results from experiments in which we solve this identiﬁcation problem by eliciting the
players’ strategies.
That strategic motivations are in play in ﬁnitely repeated social dilemma experiments is
alluded to by the so-called end-game eﬀect: a sharp decline in cooperation in the last period(s) of
a repeated game, particularly in two-player games (see Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Keser and van
Winden, 2000). Clearly, cooperation can drop because strategically-motivated individuals, who
reciprocate others’ cooperation solely when there is future interaction, do not have an incentive
to cooperate in the last period.1 However, it can also drop because non-strategically-motivated
individuals, who reciprocate others’ cooperation even in the absence of future interaction, believe
others will stop cooperating in the last period.2 In other words, since both strategically- and
non-strategically-motivated individuals can cause the decline in cooperation, it is diﬃcult to
know what the contribution of each type of motivation is.3
The same confounding eﬀect is found in other experiments that oﬀer evidence for strategic
cooperation. For example, one could take the increase in cooperation between repeated games
and (repetitions of) one-shot games as being caused by strategically-motivated individuals who
now have a reason to cooperate.4 However, this increase can also be driven by non-strategically-
1Kreps et al. (1982) propose a model that rationalizes this pattern by assuming incomplete information con-
cerning preferences for cooperation.
2Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and G¨ achter (2009), for example, show that people often reciprocate
others’ contributions in public good experiments without future interaction.
3This problem cannot be easily resolved by eliciting beliefs since only on rare occasions will the diﬀerently-
motivated individuals exhibit diﬀerent belief-action combinations. The experiments of Croson (2000) and G¨ achter
and Renner (2006), for example, show that the observed pattern of beliefs closely resembles the observed pattern
of actions.
4An increase in cooperation between partner-matching and random-matching treatments has been found in
bribery games (Abbink, 2004), principal-agent games (Cochard and Willinger, 2005), trust games (Huck et al.,
2006), conﬂict games (Lacomba et al., 2008), prisoners’ dilemma games (Duﬀy and Ochs, 2009), gift-exchange
games (G¨ achter and Falk, 2002), and public good games (Croson, 1996; Keser and van Winden, 2000). In contrast,
1motivated individuals who cooperate more because they expect that with repeated interaction
others will be more cooperative. Similarly, the observation that cooperation is more frequent
when it is more proﬁtable can be attributed to strategic behavior and the existence of additional
cooperative equilibria.5 However, the increase in cooperation can also be due to an increase
in non-strategically-motivated cooperation that results from intrinsically-motivated individuals
who now ﬁnd cooperation relatively more attractive or from boundedly-rational individuals who
make relatively more mistakes.6
To distinguish strategic from non-strategic motivations for cooperation, we run experiments
where subjects repeatedly play a prisoners’ dilemma game—strategically equivalent to the se-
quential prisoners’ dilemma—with a probability of continuation. Speciﬁcally, we use the contingent-
response method developed by Selten (1967) to allow a ﬁrst type of players, henceforth ﬁrst
movers, to condition their decision on whether the period they are playing is or is not the ﬁnal
period of the game. Moreover, there is a second type of players, henceforth second movers, who
are allowed to condition their decision on: (i) whether the period they are playing is or is not
the ﬁnal period of the game, and (ii) whether the ﬁrst mover cooperates or defects.
This design allows us to simultaneously observe choices in the continuation game and in the
end game, and crucially, observe counterfactual behavior (of second movers) in the ﬁnal period.
That is, we know whether second movers cooperate or defect in the ﬁnal period of the game when
it is certain that the ﬁrst mover will cooperate. Second movers who are willing to cooperate in the
ﬁnal period must be motivated, at least in part, by non-strategic reasons.7 In contrast, second
movers who always defect in the ﬁnal period, but who are willing to cooperate in non-ﬁnal
periods, are clearly cooperating for strategic reasons.8 In addition, this design clearly isolates
Andreoni (1988) ﬁnds more cooperation under random matching (for an explanation of these mixed results see
Andreoni and Croson, 2003).
5For example, in settings described by Friedman (1971).
6The inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), for example, predicts such an eﬀect. So does the
quantal-response equilibrium, which assumes that mistakes are less likely if they are more costly (McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1995), and the logit model of Anderson et al. (1998), which allows for altruism and errors.
7It is not our intention to suggest that individuals who cooperate in the ﬁnal period are failing to take into
account strategic considerations. Instead, we suggest that players who exhibit this behavior are not exclusively
motivated by strategic considerations.
8We can make this inference for second movers as they face no uncertainty with respect to the ﬁrst mover’s
behavior. Expectations about the behavior of others do play a role for ﬁrst movers. Consequently, we cannot fully
identify their motivations for cooperation. For this reason, we concentrate most of our analysis on second movers.
2the end-game eﬀect. In games with a ﬁnite number of periods, diﬀering abilities to perform
backward induction (Selten and Stoecker, 1986; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992; Katok et al., 2002)
can distribute the end-game eﬀect over the last few periods. In our experiment, cooperation in
non-ﬁnal and ﬁnal periods is clearly diﬀerentiated.
Another feature of our design is that, just like in ﬁnitely-repeated games, mutual cooperation
is not an equilibrium if it is common knowledge that all players are rational own-payoﬀ maxi-
mizers. In this setting, the motivation to strategically cooperate is limited to individuals who
believe that suﬃciently many others reciprocate cooperative actions for non-strategic reasons
(see Kreps et al., 1982).
There are other studies that investigate behavior in the sequential prisoners’ dilemma (Brandts
and Charness, 2000; Clark and Sefton, 2001) and/or examine motivations for cooperation by elic-
iting strategies (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and G¨ achter, 2009).9 However, they use
one-shot settings, which preclude strategic behavior. Other studies use the subjects’ behavior to
infer their repeated-game strategies (Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2004, 2006). In these experi-
ments, it is found that subjects use strategies that produce an end-game eﬀect in ﬁnitely-repeated
games and punishment of free riders that resemble grim-trigger strategies in inﬁnitely-repeated
games.10 However, since both of these results can be due to both strategic and non-strategic
motives, these papers cannot diﬀerentiate between the two motivations.
Another related study is Muller et al. (2008). It consists of an experiment where subjects
play a two-period linear public good game in which they can condition their contribution in
the second period on the total contribution of others in the ﬁrst period. They conclude that
strategic behavior has a more pronounced eﬀect than learning in explaining the usually-observed
decline in contributions in public good games. Our design improves on theirs for the purpose
of identifying strategically- and non-strategically-motivated cooperation. In particular, in their
design, choices within each period are simultaneous and therefore aﬀected by expectations. For
example, even if subjects are intrinsically motivated to reciprocate cooperation, they might still
choose to defect in the second period—even for high ﬁrst-period contributions—because they
believe others cooperated strategically in the ﬁrst period and will defect in the second.
9Muller et al. (2008) provide an extensive review of this literature.
10Dal B´ o (2005), Dal B´ o and Fr´ echette (2007), and Duﬀy and Ochs (2009) study cooperation in indeﬁnitely-
repeated prisoners’ dilemma games. They ﬁnd high cooperation rates in treatments where mutual cooperation is
an equilibrium. Unlike these studies, mutual cooperation is not an equilibrium in our experiments (with common
knowledge that all players are rational own-payoﬀ maximizers).
3On the basis of three treatments, with two diﬀerent subject pools, we ﬁnd that most of
the observed cooperation is strategically motivated. However, the relative importance of non-
strategic motivations increases with the proﬁtability of cooperation. Lastly, with the use of two
control treatments we ﬁnd that using contingent responses does not alter the behavior of the
second movers.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the game and methodology used
in the experiments. In section 3 we describe in detail the experimental design and procedures.
We present the results in section 4 and conclude in section 5.
2 Description of the game and methodology
The game played in the experiment is the strategic equivalent of a repeated sequential prisoners’
dilemma. In each period, with probability (1 − δ) the game ends after the period is played and
with probability δ the game continues. In the stage game, each of the two players can either
cooperate or defect. If both players cooperate they each get πC, if both defect they each get πD,
and if one defects and the other cooperates the defector gets the temptation payoﬀ πT and the
cooperator gets the sucker payoﬀ πS. Payoﬀs are such that defecting is the dominant strategy
(πT > πC > πD > πS), and mutual cooperation is the eﬃcient outcome (2πC > πT + πS).
The main feature of our design is that, in each period, players can condition their action
on whether they are currently playing the last period of the game or whether the game will
continue. In addition, one of the two players is designated to be the ﬁrst mover and the other
to be the second mover. The second mover can, additionally, condition her action on whether
the ﬁrst mover cooperates or defects. In other words, the ﬁrst mover submits an action for two
cases: (i) the game continues and (ii) the game ends; and the second mover submits an action
for four cases: (i) the ﬁrst mover cooperates and the game continues, (ii) the ﬁrst mover defects
and the game continues, (iii) the ﬁrst mover cooperates and the game ends, and (iv) the ﬁrst
mover defects and the game ends. After both players make a decision, they learn whether they
were playing the last period of the game or not, and they are informed about the corresponding
action of the other player.11
As is well known, full cooperation in repeated games with an unknown end can be achieved by
rational own-payoﬀ maximizing individuals with the use of trigger strategies (Friedman, 1971).
In fact, for a suﬃciently high δ, any proﬁle of play can be sustained as part of a subgame perfect
11Players are informed only of the realized action of the other player and not of all their contingent choices.
4equilibrium (Rubinstein, 1979; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). In our game, mutual cooperation
by rational own-payoﬀ maximizers is supported if the continuation probability falls above the
threshold δ∗ = (πT − πC)/(πT − πD).12 This follows from the fact that both players always
defect when they play the ﬁnal period of the game, which makes the game in non-ﬁnal periods
equivalent to a game with an unknown end.13 In this case, mutual cooperation can be sustained
by a trigger strategy only if δ ≥ δ∗, in which case the second mover gets a higher payoﬀ by
cooperating than by defecting.14
In order to match as closely as possible the conditions in a ﬁnitely-repeated game, we use
parameter values such that mutual cooperation is not an equilibrium if it is common knowledge
that all players are rational own-payoﬀ maximizers. This reduces the motivation to strategically
cooperate to individuals who believe others will reciprocate cooperation for non-strategic reasons.
Speciﬁcally, we set the probability of continuation and the payoﬀs of the stage game such that
δ < δ∗ in all our treatments.15
As previously mentioned, our design allows us to observe the stage-game strategies used by
second movers.16 There are two strategies that are of special interest. The ﬁrst one consists
of conditionally cooperating with the ﬁrst mover irrespective of whether it is the last period or
not. We refer to this strategy as strong reciprocity, that is, reciprocity irrespective of potential
future interaction (Gintis, 2000; Fehr et al., 2002). The second one corresponds to conditionally
12We are assuming no time discounting in the experiment, which we think is reasonable since the time interval
between periods is very short and subjects are not paid until the end.
13A general worry with playing games with an unknown end is that subjects know the experiment cannot last
for an extremely long time. Thus, they might discount future interactions at a rate that is lower than δ. However,
for the purpose of our experiment, this can at most induce a very small decrease in the frequency of strategically
motivated cooperation (individuals who are not strategically motivated and those who are already unconditionally
defecting are not aﬀected by more discounting).
14Given that the second mover has no reason to cooperate if the ﬁrst mover defects, the ﬁrst mover does not
have an incentive to deviate from an equilibrium with mutual cooperation.





D) (see Stahl, 1991). However, these equilibria require a high degree of coordination that is
hard to achieve in the laboratory. We report whether there is evidence for these type of strategies in footnote 21.
Alternatively, mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium if there is a fraction of ﬁrst and/or second
movers who (are believed to) play according to a tit-for-tat strategy (see Kreps et al., 1982). We discuss this
possibility in the conclusions.
16To facilitate reading, we will often refer to stage-game strategies simply as strategies. We do not elicit the
actual strategies for the whole game as doing so could require an inﬁnite number of questions.
5Table 1: Strategies of second movers
Not the last period Last period
First mover First mover First mover First mover
Strategy Cooperates Defects Cooperates Defects
Reputation building Cooperate Defect Defect Defect
Strong reciprocity Cooperate Defect Cooperate Defect
Unconditional defection Defect Defect Defect Defect
Unconditional cooperation Cooperate Cooperate Cooperate Cooperate
cooperating as long as the last period is not being played and defecting if it is. We refer to this
strategy as reputation building as it is a clear example of strategically-motivated cooperation.
These and other important strategies are described in Table 1. For example, it is also informative
to know the prevalence of second movers who choose the strategy of unconditional defection. We
should note, however, that we cannot diﬀerentiate between second movers who are strategic but
defect because they play a defection equilibrium and second movers who defect for non-strategic
reasons.
3 Experimental design and procedures
We ran two experiments, each with a diﬀerent subject pool. Both experiments were conducted
in 2007 with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and lasted about 45 minutes. Subjects were recruited
through online recruitment systems. In total, 312 subjects participated in the experiments.
Each subject played only once. After their arrival, subjects drew a card to be randomly assigned
to a seat in the laboratory, and consequently to a role and a treatment. Once everyone was
seated, subjects were given the instructions for the experiment. The instructions are written with
neutral language. Thereafter, roles were revealed and subjects had to answer control questions to
corroborate their understanding of the game. Next, they played the game until the random draw
indicated that it ended. Roles and pairs were kept constant throughout the experiment giving
us one independent observation per second mover. Once the game ﬁnished, subjects answered a
debrieﬁng questionnaire after which they were paid in cash and dismissed. See the Appendix for
the speciﬁc treatment parameters of both experiments (A.1) and an example of the instructions
(A.2).
6Experiment I
The ﬁrst experiment was run in CentERlab at Tilburg University. It consisted of one treatment
where we implemented the game described above, which we refer to as Tilburg, and two control
treatments. The purpose of Tilburg is to identify the various strategies used by second movers,
while the purpose of the control treatments is to identify any behavioral changes induced by the
contingent response method.
In principle, it is possible that the use of the contingent response method induces a change
in behavior. In the experimental literature there is yet no consensus if this is indeed the case.
Various authors report no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in, for example, sequential dictator games (Cason
and Mui, 1998) and, closest to our study, chicken and prisoners’ dilemma games (Brandts and
Charness, 2000). However, there are also studies that do ﬁnd diﬀerences in behavior. For
instance, some authors have found less punishment with the use of contingent responses than
without it (Brosig et al., 2003; Falk et al., 2005). For this reason, we use two control treatments
to test whether the method aﬀects behavior in our setting. In the ﬁrst control treatment, Control
I, subjects play the same game as in Tilburg except that they no longer submit a decision for
both ﬁnal and non-ﬁnal periods. In this treatment, subjects are told whether the game ends or
continues before the start of each period, and then they make their decision. Note that second
movers still submit separate choices depending on whether the ﬁrst mover cooperates or not. By
comparing choices between this control and Tilburg, we can test whether behavior is aﬀected by
conditioning decisions on whether it is the last period or not. In the second control, Control II,
we again implement the same game but this time without the use of contingent responses (i.e.,
they play the game “normally”). Here, subjects are told whether the game ends or continues
before the start of each period, and second movers learn what the ﬁrst mover did before they
make their choice. By comparing behavior between the two control treatments, we can test
whether the decisions of second movers are aﬀected by the possibility to condition their choice
on the action of the ﬁrst mover.
In all three treatments, we chose a continuation probability of δ = 0.60 and the payoﬀs of
the stage game were selected so that δ∗ = 0.61. We used a computer to randomly determine
when the game ends, and in order to make the three treatments more comparable, the random
sequence of each pair in Tilburg was used for one pair in each control treatment. The average
number of periods played equaled 2.73, and average earnings were e9.38.
7Experiment II
The second experiment was run at Northwestern University. It consisted of two treatments in
which we implemented the game with the full use of contingent responses and used a coin toss to
determine whether the game continued or ended. In other words, the continuation probability
was equal to δ = 0.50. In the ﬁrst of the two treatments, Northwestern High, we used a high
payoﬀ for mutual cooperation such that δ∗ = 0.56. In the second treatment, Northwestern
Low, we used a low payoﬀ of mutual cooperation (keeping everything else constant) such that
δ∗ = 0.72. The average number of periods played in Northwestern Low and High was 2.32 and
4.06, respectively, and average earnings equaled $11.20.
These two treatments were run for the following reasons. First, they allow us to check
whether the results from experiment I extend to cases where δ is not as close to δ∗. Second, it
is interesting to see how the elicited strategies change as one varies the beneﬁt of cooperation.
It is well established that even if there is a dominant strategy to defect, subjects cooperate
more if it is more proﬁtable to do so (e.g., Isaac and Walker, 1988). With our design we can
evaluate how much of this increase is due to strategic and how much to non-strategic cooperation.
Third, although the evidence is mixed, there is some worry that the use of economics and
business students biases results in experiments involving cooperative behavior (e.g., Marwell
and Ames, 1981; Engelmann and Strobel, 2006; Fehr et al., 2006). Since Tilburg’s subject pool
consists mainly of such students, we ran this experiment in Northwestern University and excluded
students who study economics or a related ﬁeld.17
4 Results
In this section we present the experimental results. Throughout the section, we test diﬀerences
in frequencies using likelihood-ratio χ2 tests. Since this is our most common test, in order to
avoid unnecessary repetition, we simply report the resulting p-values when it is used. Moreover,
since diﬀerent second movers played the game a diﬀerent number of periods, all reported values
that are based on aggregate data across periods are adjusted by the inverse number of periods
played. This way, each pair receives an equal weight. Note that none of the qualitative results
change if we concentrate on the ﬁrst period, which was played only once by all second movers.
17In Northwestern, the areas of study were: journalism/communication (21%), engineering (21%), bi-
ology/chemistry/physics (16%), anthropology/political science/sociology (15%), history/languages/philosophy,
(12%), arts (8%), and others (8%).
8Table 2: Realized cooperation rates
Note: The table shows realized mutual cooperation rates and realized cooperation
rates by role and action of the ﬁrst mover in the three main treatments. Statistics




Mutual cooperation rate 19% 19% 3%
Cooperation rate 33% 28% 18%
of ﬁrst movers 41% 33% 31%
of second movers 25% 23% 4%
if ﬁrst mover cooperates 46% 60% 10%
if ﬁrst mover defects 10% 5% 2%
Summary statistics for the realized outcomes are presented in Table 2. As can be seen,
subjects cooperate at similar rates in Tilburg and Northwestern High and somewhat less in
Northwestern Low. Comparing the two Northwestern treatments, we ﬁnd mutual cooperation to
be signiﬁcantly more frequent in Northwestern High vis-` a-vis Northwestern Low (p = 0.025). The
same is true, albeit weakly, for the overall cooperation rate (p = 0.054). This ﬁnding conﬁrms
our expectation that the occurrence of cooperation is sensitive to its proﬁtability. We can also
observe that ﬁrst movers cooperate more often than second movers (as in Clark and Sefton,
2001). Moreover, consistent with existent literature, cooperation by second movers is strongly
conditioned on the action of the ﬁrst mover.18
Next, we proceed to the paper’s main results. In subsection 4.1, we provide an overview of the
subjects’ strategies in order to observe their motivations for cooperation. In subsection 4.2, we
turn to the causes of the end-game eﬀect. We would also like to stress that behavior in Tilburg
does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from that in the two control treatments. In other words, in this
game, we do not see that the use of contingent responses induces diﬀerent behavior compared
to “hot” decision-making. Given that this analysis is not central to our paper, we put it in the
Appendix (A.3).
18Average cooperation rates between ﬁrst and second movers are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in all treatments with
Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests (p < 0.009). Similarly, average cooperation rates by second movers are signiﬁcantly
higher if the ﬁrst mover cooperates than if the ﬁrst mover defects (Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests, p < 0.004).
94.1 First and second movers’ strategies
We begin with the ﬁrst movers’ strategies. A large percentage of the ﬁrst movers’ stage-game
strategies consist of always defecting: 39% in Tilburg, 53% in Northwestern High, and 56% in
Northwestern Low. For ﬁrst movers who cooperate, we ﬁnd that most do so only in non-ﬁnal
periods. In other words, their stage-game strategy consists of cooperating if it is not the last
period and defecting otherwise. In Tilburg, 75% of ﬁrst movers who cooperate submit this
strategy; in Northwestern High it is 59% and in Northwestern Low 46%.19 This is interesting
as ﬁrst movers have an incentive to defect in the last period only if they anticipate that a large
fraction of second movers cooperate strategically.
Now, we turn to the second movers’ strategies in order to identify their motivation for coop-
eration. Figure 1 presents the distribution of second movers’ strategies in Tilburg and the two
Northwestern treatments using the classiﬁcation of Table 1. Overall, unconditional defection is
the most common strategy. It is chosen from 28% to 60% of the time. However, there is still
considerable space for strategies that involve some cooperation.
In all treatments, the most frequent strategy that includes some cooperation is reputation
building. It accounts for around 30% of all strategies.20 This is even the case in Northwestern
Low where the continuation probability is well below δ∗. The third most common strategy is
strong reciprocity, whose frequency varies between 6% and 23%. Unconditional cooperation is
used less than 5% of the time and other strategies between 2% and 14%.21
19Cooperating in both non-ﬁnal and ﬁnal periods is the next most common strategy. It accounts for 18% in
Tilburg, 26% in Northwestern High, and 35% in Northwestern Low of the strategies that involve some cooperation.
20Reputation building is also the most common reason for second-movers’ realized cooperation. The fraction of
cooperative actions of second movers that are due to reputation building is 57% in Tilburg, 32% in Northwestern
High, and 67% in Northwestern Low. Strong reciprocity accounts for 14% of the second movers’ cooperation
in Tilburg, 29% in Northwestern High, and 0% in Northwestern Low. Other relatively important strategies are
unconditional cooperation, which accounts for 17% of cooperative actions in Tilburg and 14% in Northwestern
High (0% in Northwestern Low), and the strategy that consists of always cooperating if it is not the last period
and conditionally cooperating if it is, which accounts for 14% of cooperative actions in Northwestern High (0% in
the other two treatments).
21Two strategies account for around 70% of those in the “other” category. The ﬁrst is always defecting if it is
not the last period and conditionally cooperating if it is. The second is always cooperating if it is not the last
period and conditionally cooperating if it is. Note that we don’t ﬁnd support for cooperation due to correlated
equilibria (Stahl, 1991)—perhaps due to the lack of a suitable coordination device. In these equilibria, we ought
to observe some second movers choosing in non-ﬁnal periods to cooperate if the ﬁrst mover defects and defect if














Northwestern High Northwestern Low Tilburg
Reputation building Unconditional defection
Strong reciprocity Unconditional cooperation
Other
None
Figure 1: Frequency of strategies
Note: The pie charts show, for each treatment and across all periods, the frequency of
strategies used by second movers classiﬁed according to Table 1. Strategies are weighted by
the inverse number of periods played by each subject.
In Figure 1 one can also observe which strategies are responsible for the higher cooperation
rate in Northwestern High compared to Northwestern Low (the distributions are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent, p = 0.043). The increase in cooperation rates is driven by a sharp decrease in the
frequency of unconditional defection and an increase in strong reciprocity, unconditional cooper-
ation, and strategies under “other.” Interestingly, the frequency of reputation building is almost
identical.
Next we turn to the relative importance of the various strategies in explaining the prevalence
of conditional cooperation among second movers. To do so, we use their strategies to calculate
the stage-game strategy we would have observed if second movers could condition their choice
on the action of the ﬁrst mover but could not condition on whether it was the last period or not.
If this had been the case, we would have observed that most cooperative outcomes are the result
of second movers who conditionally cooperate: 76% in Tilburg, 86% in Northwestern High, and
92% in Northwestern Low. Now, if we look at the strategies that are behind the conditional-
cooperation pattern, we ﬁnd that reputation building is the most common. In Tilburg, reputation
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Figure 2: Mutual Cooperation Rates
Note: The ﬁgure shows, for each treatment, the rate of mutual cooperation per period
calculated using both the subjects’ non-ﬁnal-period action and their ﬁnal-period action.
Rates for period three and up are pooled as by then the number of observations has decreased
considerably in some treatments.
in Northwestern Low 64%. The respective percentages for strong reciprocity are 12%, 44%, and
36%.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the strategies listed in Table 1 are fairly stable both across periods
and within subjects, whereas other strategies are less stable. This analysis is provided in the
Appendix (A.4).
4.2 Disentangling the end-game eﬀect
On average, subjects cooperate less often in ﬁnal periods compared to non-ﬁnal periods. The mu-
tual cooperation rate calculated with the subjects’ continuation strategies (i.e., their contingent
choices in non-ﬁnal periods) is signiﬁcantly higher in all treatments than the mutual coopera-
tion rate calculated with their end-game strategies (i.e., the subjects’ contingent choices in ﬁnal
periods): in Tilburg, it drops from 33% to 4%, in Northwestern High it drops from 25% to 10%,
12and in Northwestern Low it drops from 10% to 0% (Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests, p < 0.026).22
This drop can be observed in Figure 2 for each period t ∈ {1,2,3+}. From the ﬁgure, one can
see that already in the ﬁrst period there is an obvious diﬀerence between behavior in non-ﬁnal
and ﬁnal periods,23 which indicates that, even before they have had the opportunity to interact,
subjects make a clear distinction between the two situations.24
Generally, the end-game eﬀect occurs due to two distinct causes. First, individuals that
cooperate solely because of the existence of future interaction switch to defection in the hope of
getting the temptation payoﬀ. Second, individuals that are willing to conditionally cooperate
even in the ﬁnal period of a game switch to defection because they expect others will now defect.
In our design, each role (ﬁrst and second mover) is aﬀected by only one of these causes. On
the one hand, since second movers can condition their choice on that of the ﬁrst mover, their
strategies are independent of their expectation of ﬁrst-mover cooperation. On the other hand,
given that cooperation is almost exclusively conditional, the ﬁrst movers’ willingness to cooperate
should be driven exclusively by their expectation of second-mover cooperation.
To observe the impact of each of the two causes, we calculate the eﬀect on the mutual
cooperation rate of varying one cause while keeping the other constant. In other words, to
observe the impact on the end-game eﬀect of the strategic behavior of second movers we: (i)
compare the cooperation rate calculated with the continuation strategy of both ﬁrst and second
movers to the cooperation rate calculated with the continuation strategy of ﬁrst movers and the
end-game strategy of second movers, and (ii) compare the cooperation rate calculated with the
end-game strategy of both ﬁrst and second movers to the cooperation rate calculated with the
end-game strategy of ﬁrst movers and the continuation strategy of second movers. To observe
the eﬀect of expectations, we do the equivalent comparisons. That is, we: (i) compare the
cooperation rate calculated with the continuation strategy of both ﬁrst and second movers to
22We concentrate on mutual cooperation rates calculated using the subjects’ strategies. However, the strong
end-game eﬀect is also evident with realized rates of mutual cooperation: depending on whether it is the last
period or not, mutual cooperation drops from 36% to 3% in Tilburg, from 19% to 9% in Northwestern High, and
from 6% to 0% in Northwestern Low (p < 0.001).
23Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests of diﬀerences in the mutual cooperation rate in t = 1 depending on whether it is
calculated with continuation or with end-game strategies yield p = 0.001 in Tilburg, p = 0.083 in Northwestern
High, and p = 0.046 in Northwestern Low.
24We do not ﬁnd evidence in any of the treatments for a time trend in the mutual cooperation rate (calculated
either with continuation or end-game strategies). In all treatments, Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcients
between mutual cooperation rates and periods are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (p > 0.204).
13Table 3: Causes of the end-game eﬀect
Note: The table shows the mutual cooperation rate calculated using either the continuation
or the end-game strategy of ﬁrst movers in combination with either the continuation or end-
game strategy of second movers. ≫ and > indicate, at 5% and 10% respectively, statistically
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the cooperation rate calculated with the end-game strategy of ﬁrst movers and the continuation
strategy of second movers, and (ii) compare the cooperation rate calculated with the end-game
strategy of both ﬁrst and second movers to the cooperation rate calculated with the continuation
strategy of ﬁrst movers and the end-game strategy of second movers.
These comparisons can be seen in Table 3 where we present the mutual cooperation rates
calculated with the diﬀerent combinations of continuation and end-game strategies. In the table,
we also indicate statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences based on Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests. In
Tilburg, both strategic behavior and expectations cause a signiﬁcant drop in the mutual coop-
eration rate. In Northwestern High, we ﬁnd that whereas expectations cause a signiﬁcant drop
in cooperation, strategic behavior does not. Conversely, in Northwestern Low strategic behavior
causes a signiﬁcant drop in cooperation but expectations do not.
All in all, this analysis demonstrates that the end-game eﬀect is caused both by the strategic
behavior of second movers and by the expectation of such behavior by ﬁrst movers. However,
the relative impact of each of these causes changes with the proﬁtability of cooperation. In
Northwestern Low, where the ratio of non-strategic to strategic cooperation is low, the end-game
eﬀect is mostly due to the disappearance of strategic incentives to cooperate. In Northwestern
High, where this ratio is high, the end-game eﬀect is mostly due to overly pessimistic expectations
by ﬁrst movers.25
25This diﬀerence might disappear if ﬁrst movers have opportunities to update beliefs about the distribution of
second movers, for example, by playing the indeﬁnitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game repeatedly and receiving
145 Conclusions
In this paper we provide evidence of the relative importance of strategic versus non-strategic
motivations for cooperation in social dilemmas. We report the results of a laboratory experiment
where subjects play the strategic equivalent of a repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma with a
probabilistic end. The novelty of our design is that choices can be conditioned on whether the
period of play is the ﬁnal period or not, which allows us to identify the frequency of strategically-
motivated and non-strategically-motivated cooperation.26
We ﬁnd that the behavior of second movers is basically the result of three strategies: (i)
unconditional defection, which accounts for 28% to 60% of all strategies, (ii) reputation building,
which accounts for 27% to 33% of all strategies, and (iii) strong reciprocity, which accounts for
between 6% and 23% of all strategies. As reported in the Appendix (A.4), we also ﬁnd that this
distribution of strategies is fairly stable in time and within subjects.
If we concentrate on second movers who cooperated, we ﬁnd that the strategy with the highest
weight is reputation building—it accounts for between 32% and 67% of the realized cooperative
actions—followed by strong reciprocity, which accounts for between 0% and 29% of cooperative
actions.
Although in our experiment mutual cooperation is not supported in equilibrium when it is
common knowledge that all players are rational own-payoﬀ maximizers, the observed share of
reputation building could be explained with the model of Kreps et al. (1982). In this model,
reputation building pays oﬀ due to the existence of tit-for-tat players, which in our analysis
could be seen as subjects who use the strong reciprocity strategy. Since the model utilizes mixed
strategies—which are hard to observe by eliciting only stage-game strategies (see the discussion
in Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2008)—we are unable to test whether the observed amount of
reputation building is consistent with the model’s predictions.27
We also ﬁnd that an increase in the payoﬀ of mutual cooperation increases the frequency
of strong reciprocity. This ﬁnding is consistent with the idea that individuals possess social
preferences—which induce them to act as strong reciprocators—but nevertheless react to changes
information about outcomes of other pairs.
26In the Appendix (A.3) we show that using contingent responses does not aﬀect behavior compared to the
direct-response method.
27In addition, the uncertain duration of the game used in this paper makes it unclear how to calculate the
subjects’ optimal behavior once cooperation starts to unravel. For experimental tests of the Kreps et al. (1982)
model, see Camerer and Weigelt (1988) and Andreoni and Miller (1993).
15in ﬁnancial incentives (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). The ﬁnding is also consistent with a
quantal-response equilibrium that treats strong reciprocity as an error which is more likely to
be made the lower its cost (i.e., the higher the cooperation payoﬀ relative to the temptation
payoﬀ).28
Interestingly, the increase in the payoﬀ of mutual cooperation also increases the ratio of repu-
tation builders to unconditional defectors (from 45% to 75%). This change is roughly consistent
with Kreps et al. (1982) since an increase in the share of strong reciprocators in a population
makes reputation building more proﬁtable for the remaining “rational” players, and therefore,
they ought to be more likely to reputation-build as opposed to unconditionally defect.
Lastly, we decompose the causes of the end-game eﬀect and demonstrate that cooperation
drops due to both strategic behavior and the anticipation of such behavior. Interestingly, de-
pending on the proﬁtability of cooperation (and possibly the subject pool),29 the cause of the
end-game eﬀect changes.
28Goeree et al. (2002) integrate the two interpretations (social preferences and errors) in a one-shot public good
game.
29For example, Bohnet et al. (2008) and G¨ achter et al. (2008) are recent studies that ﬁnd diﬀerences in cooper-
ation and trust across diﬀerent cultures.
16A Appendix
A.1 Overview of experiments and treatments
Table A1: Overview of experiments and treatments
Experiment I Experiment II




Mutual defection πD 15 15 15 15 15
Unilateral defection πT 33 33 33 33 33
Unilateral cooperation πS 10 10 10 6 6
Mutual cooperation πC 22 22 22 23 20
Probability of continuation δ 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.50
Threshold for cooperation δ∗ 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.72
Characteristics
Location Tilburg Tilburg Tilburg Northwestern Northwestern
Field of study Economics Economics Economics Not economics Not economics
Number of second movers 30 30 30 32 34
Note: 10 points equaled e1.50 in experiment I and $2.00 in experiment II; amounts exclude a show-up
fee of $6 in experiment II.
A.2 Instructions
These are the instructions for the Northwestern High treatment. The instructions for other
treatments are very similar and are available from the authors upon request.
General
You are participating in an experiment on economic decision making and will be asked to make
a number of decisions. If you follow the instructions carefully, you can earn money. At the end
of the experiment, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash.
You are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a question, raise
your hand and one of us will help you.
17During the experiment your earnings will be expressed in points. Points will be converted to
US dollars at the following rate: 10 points = $2.00.
The experiment is strictly anonymous: that is, your identity will not be revealed to others
and the identity of others will not be revealed to you.
In the experiment, participants will be randomly divided into groups of 2 participants. You
will therefore be in a group with one other participant. The composition of the groups will
remain the same during the entire experiment.
In each group, one participant will be randomly assigned to the ﬁrst mover position. The
other participant in the group will be in the second mover position. Your position as ﬁrst or
second mover will remain the same during the entire experiment.
Your decision in each period
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period, both the ﬁrst and the second mover make
a choice between option A and option B. The ﬁrst mover makes his/her decision ﬁrst. Thereafter
the second mover makes his/her decision. The following table shows what the ﬁrst and second





both choose A 23 23
ﬁrst mover chooses A and
the second mover chooses B
6 33
ﬁrst mover chooses B and
the second mover chooses A
33 6
both choose B 15 15
Number of Periods
For each group, the number of periods of in the experiment is determined randomly. At the
end of each period, we will throw a coin to determine whether that period was the last period
of the experiment or whether the experiment continues (heads means the experiment continues
and tails means the experiment ends). Thus, in every period the probability that the experiment
continues is 50% and the probability that the experiment ends is 50%. Your total earnings in
the experiment will equal the sum of earnings across all periods.
18After each period, you will receive feedback concerning the decision of the other participant
in your group and on your earnings.
The decision of the ﬁrst mover
In each period, the ﬁrst mover makes his/her decision in each of the two following situations:
• Do you choose A or B if the current period is not the ﬁnal period (in other words the
experiment proceeds to a next period)?
• Do you choose A or B if the current period is the ﬁnal period (in other words the experiment
does not proceed)?
If the result of the coin toss is that the experiment continues (heads), then earnings in that
period will depend on the answer to the ﬁrst question. If the result of the coin toss is that the
experiment ends (tails), then earnings depend on the answer to the second question.
The decision of the second mover
In each period, the second mover makes his/her decision in each of the four following situations:
• If the ﬁrst mover chooses A: Do you choose A or B if the current period is not the ﬁnal
period (in other words the experiment proceeds to a next period)?
• If the ﬁrst mover chooses A: Do you choose A or B if the current period is the ﬁnal period
(in other words the experiment does not proceed)?
• If the ﬁrst mover chooses B: Do you choose A or B if the current period is not the ﬁnal
period (in other words the experiment proceeds to a next period)?
• If the ﬁrst mover chooses B: Do you choose A or B if the current period is the ﬁnal period
(in other words the experiment does not proceed)?
If the result of the coin toss is that the experiment continues (heads) and the ﬁrst mover
chooses A, earnings will depend on the answer to the ﬁrst question. If the result of the coin toss
is that the experiment ends (tails) and the ﬁrst mover chooses A, earnings will depend on the
answer to the second question. If the result of the coin toss is that the experiment continues
(heads) and the ﬁrst mover chooses B, earnings will depend on the answer to the third question.
If the result of the coin toss is that the experiment ends (tails) and the ﬁrst mover chooses B,











Tilburg Control I Control II
Mutual defection 1st mover cooperates & 2nd mover defects
Mutual cooperation 1st mover defects & 2nd mover cooperates
None
Figure A1: Comparing outcomes with control treatments
Note: The pie charts show the frequency of each of the four possible outcomes in Tilburg and
the two control treatments. Outcomes are weighted by the inverse of the number of periods
played by each pair.
A.3 Control treatments
To ensure that the use of the contingent-response method does not result in diﬀerent behavior
than the direct-response method, we use this subsection to compare behavior in Tilburg and the
two control treatments.
Figure A1 gives an overview of the distribution of realized outcomes in the three treatments.
It is clear that outcomes are highly similar. This is corroborated if we test for equality of
distributions across the three treatments (p = 0.992).30
Next, we compare Tilburg with Control I to determine whether the elicited stage-game
strategies change when they are conditioned on whether it is the last period or not. One could
worry that conditioning on the ﬁnal period might trigger more strategic thinking than otherwise,
and therefore, if contingent responses are elicited, there could be less conditional cooperation
in the last period. However, we do not ﬁnd this to be the case. As is shown in the top part
of Table A2, the frequencies of stage-game strategies for both treatments for non-ﬁnal and ﬁnal
30We do not get statistical signiﬁcance either if we do pairwise comparisons between treatments (p > 0.910), or
if we compare separately across treatments the frequency of each strategy (p > 0.745).
20Table A2: Comparing strategies with control treatments
Note: The top half of the table shows, for Tilburg and the control treatments, the distribution of the
second movers’ stage-game strategies depending on whether it is the last period or not. The bottom half
shows the second movers’ cooperation rates depending on the ﬁrst mover’s choice (actual cooperation rates
for Control II and cooperation rates implied by the stage-game strategies in the other two treatments).
Strategies and rates are weighted by the inverse of the number of periods played by each pair.
if not last period if last period
Tilburg Control I Control II Tilburg Control I Control II
Comparing stage-game strategies
Always cooperate 9% 2% 5% 10%
Cooperate if ﬁrst mover cooperates 39% 50% 16% 17%
Cooperate if ﬁrst mover defects 3% 5% 1% 7%
Always defect 49% 44% 78% 67%
Comparing cooperation rates
When the ﬁrst mover cooperates 48% 52% 54% 21% 27% 13%
When the ﬁrst mover defects 12% 7% 8% 6% 17% 14%
periods are very similar (distributions are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent: p = 0.642 for non-ﬁnal
periods and p = 0.581 for ﬁnal periods). Furthermore, in Control I we do not see a higher
frequency of conditional cooperation in ﬁnal periods.31
Lastly, we compare cooperation rates between Control II and the other two treatments to
test whether second movers’ choices are aﬀected by conditioning them on the ﬁrst movers’ action.
The actual cooperation rates in Control II and the ones implied by the strategies in the other
treatments are seen in the bottom part of Table A2. We do not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the frequencies of the three treatments when running tests that compare
separately non-ﬁnal periods and ﬁnal periods depending on whether the ﬁrst mover cooperates
or defects (p > 0.428). This also holds if we do pairwise tests between treatments (p = 0.202).
Thus, we conclude that, for our purpose, the contingent response or strategy method is a valid
technique since it does not induce diﬀerent behavior compared to “hot” decision-making.
31There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences if we compare separately the frequency of each stage-game strategy across
treatments (p > 0.268).
21A.4 Stability of strategies
We brieﬂy analyze the stability over time of the distribution of strategies. In all treatments, the
frequencies of strategies do not change considerably across periods. If we test in each treatment
for equality of distributions between the ﬁrst three periods, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
(p > 0.570). This ﬁnding tells us that the relative inﬂuences of reputation building and strong
reciprocity vary little with repetition.32 Next, we check whether this relative stability is hiding
substantial changes at the individual level.
In order to analyze the stability of strategies within each subject, we take a look at how often
subjects choose the same strategy. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the probability that a second mover
picks in period t the same strategy that she picked in period t−1. Overall, second movers pick the
same strategy for consecutive periods 64% of the time in Tilburg, 72% in Northwestern High, and
86% in Northwestern Low. The stability of individual strategies can be seen in Table A3 where
this probability is calculated separately for each strategy and treatment. From the table, one
can see that the three main strategies (reputation building, strong reciprocity, and unconditional
defection) are quite stable. A second mover who chooses one of these strategies has around an
80% chance of choosing the same strategy in the next period. In comparison, the strategies that
fall within “other” are considerably less robust. In most cases, these strategies are chosen for only
one period at a time.33 With respect to the motivation of second movers to switch strategies,
besides choosing a strategy under “other,” we do not ﬁnd that either the previously chosen
strategy or the outcome in the previous period has a signiﬁcant eﬀect.34 In summary, strategies
are fairly stable both across periods and within subjects. A majority of subjects consistently
32We do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences even if we do, for each treatment and strategy, pairwise comparisons
between each of the three periods (p > 0.110).
33Using binomial probability tests and the null hypothesis that the probability of choosing the same strategy in
period t and t − 1 is less than 50% (i.e. a subject is more likely to switch than to choose the same strategy), we
can (weakly) reject it in all treatments for reputation building (p < 0.001), unconditional defection (p < 0.001),
and strong reciprocity (p < 0.056). For unconditional cooperation it is rejected in Northwestern High (p = 0.032).
Treating strategies under ‘other’ as a group, we cannot reject the null in any treatment (p > 0.998).
34We ran a probit regression with a binary variable indicating whether a subject changes strategy from period t
to t+1 as the dependent variable. We used the following independent variables: dummy variables for the strategy
chosen in t, dummy variables for the realized outcome in t, treatment indicator variables, and the period number.
We ﬁnd that choosing a strategy from “other” in period t is associated with a 32% higher probability of choosing
a diﬀerent strategy in t+1 (p = 0.001, using White’s heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator to
cluster on each subject). However, we ﬁnd no other signiﬁcant eﬀect. We get the same result if we run a separate
regression for each strategy or for each treatment.
22Table A3: Stability of strategies
Note: The table shows, for each strategy and treatment, the probability that a second mover
picks in period t the same strategy that she picked in period t−1. Probabilities are weighted
by the inverse of the number of periods played by each subject.
Reputation Strong Unconditional Unconditional
Other
building reciprocity defection cooperation
Tilburg 62% 100% 77% – 0%
Northwestern High 84% 88% 68% 80% 35%
Northwestern Low 88% 80% 88% – 0%
All treatments 77% 89% 78% 80% 21%
chose one of the strategies in Table 1, while other strategies are chosen less consistently.
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